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Aesthetic Appraisal 
EVAN SIMPSON 
In the twenty-five years since philosophers began to bemoan 'the dreariness 
of aesthetics', students in Wittgenstein's wake have done a great deal to 
eliminate the grounds of the complaint. Unfruitful essentialist theories 
have been largely displaced by the vigorous, if somewhat uncontrolled, 
growth of an enterprise which attempts to characterize and explicate 
aesthetic phenomena outside the desert of definition. The resulting view 
portrays typically aesthetic concepts as being indivisibly characterizing 
and evaluative, relativistic in application, necessarily linked to human 
attitudes, irreducible to non-aesthetic oncepts, and yet as having social 
conditions which make them capable of intersubjective comparison and 
test.1 These characteristics are usefully summarized in saying that aesthetic 
concepts are concepts of appraisal. The theory of aesthetic appraisal 
discussed here is clearly incompatible with views which postulate dichoto- 
mies between objectivity and subjectivity, fact and value, and it is quite 
analogous to 'descriptivist' theories in ethics which reject these absolute 
distinctions. Moral examples are thus often useful for explicating the notion 
of aesthetic appraisal and the theory embodying that notion likewise has 
an important bearing on contemporary controversies in ethics. 
I 
Three sorts of features are commonly mentioned in specifically critical 
discourse. Some are straightforwardly descriptive. These are the relatively 
brute features of things perceivable without any critical acumen or know- 
ledge of art, and range from properties which are directly sensed (being 
red, round, E-flat, and so on) to ones for which empirical tests may be 
needed (being ten inches high, dating from the fourteenth century, or 
done in acrylic). Other properties are interpretative, in the sense that their 
identification depends upon knowledge of various traditions, conventions, 
rules, and related factors, incomplete information about which may lead to 
1 See the symposium with Frank Sibley and Michael Tanner, 'Objectivity and 
Aesthetics', Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 42 (i968), pp. 3 I- 
72. The two discussions together summarize most of the elements and problems 
of the theory described here. 
2 This term has no standard use. My use of it resembles A. R. Louch's in 
Explanation and Human Action (Oxford, i966), Ch. 4. 
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divergent characterizations. These thus include representational properties 
(being a horse or an annunciation), semantical properties (being an English 
sentence or a quarter note) and formal properties (satisfying Aristotle's 
unities or being a symphony). Whereas descriptive properties can be 
identified by anyone with human perceptual faculties and relevant factual 
knowledge, the identification of interpretative properties requires additional 
knowledge of the conventions which form part of their definitions. The 
third sort of features includes those 'aesthetic qualities' discussed on various 
occasions by Frank Sibley,3 and what he calls the 'exercise of taste' needed 
for their identification seems identical to the act of appraisal described 
below. Sibley is inclined to include expressive features, such as being sad 
or yearning, among aesthetic qualities, and they are indeed appraisal 
features. It is nevertheless important o distinguish them from others which 
include a positive or negative desirability characteristic. Such character- 
istics are ones which, unless overridden by special considerations, neces- 
sarily add to or detract from a thing's merits. Balance is usually desirable 
in works of art and garishness not, but sadness and yearning are neutral in 
this respect. It is useful to distinguish the former features by calling them 
aesthetic virtues and vices. 
There is no guarantee that 'descriptive', 'interpretative', and 'appraisal' 
features are jointly exhaustive of aesthetically relevant characteristics of 
things. If beauty fits anywhere in the classification it is among appraisals, 
but appraisals characterize as well as evaluate, and it is uncertain whether 
the word 'beautiful' conveys any information about objects at all. Perhaps a 
non-cognitive account would suffice for it and for various equally unin- 
formative cognates. This possibility need not be assessed beyond noting 
(inconclusively) that no number of appraisal features ever entails the 
presence of beauty, just as no number of non-aesthetic properties ever 
entails the presence of an appraisal feature. Lack of any guarantee that the 
three sets of characteristics are mutually exclusive constitutes a more 
significant problem. Not only is the distinction between description and 
interpretation somewhat controversial, but also there is room for doubt 
about the integrity of the aesthetic/non-aesthetic d hotomy. Nevertheless, 
the essential accuracy of the major distinctions must be taken for granted 
here. 
Sibley has carefully described the main aspects of aesthetic appraisal by 
illustrating the ways in which reference to non-aesthetic properties can 
support ascriptions of aesthetic features to works of art, and by compiling 
persuasive evidence that this support cannot be explained in terms of 
relations of reducibility or definability. Aesthetic qualities have complex 
3 First in 'Aesthetic Concepts', Philosophical Review, 68 (I959), pp. 42I-450, 
later in 'Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic', same journal, 74 (i965), pp. 134-I59, 
and in the articles cited elsewhere in this paper. 
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non-aesthetic origins but they are formally primitive. More accurately, 
since aesthetic oncepts are often interdefinable with other aesthetic on- 
cepts, no descriptive or interpretative properties provide sufficient con- 
ditions for their use. Specious rebuttals of this view are prevalent, and some 
confusions may be avoided through brief mention of the commonest ones. 
Sibley himself encourages one mistake by repeatedly describing aesthetic 
qualities as not condition-governed except for certain 'negatively' govern- 
ing conditions. Dull objects cannot be garish. It would be clearer to 
acknowledge that being bright or vivid is a necessary condition of being 
garish, and although many aesthetic qualities may lack easily specifiable 
descriptive conditions of this sort, their existence is entirely compatible 
with Sibley's stated theory.4 It is no sounder a criticism to point out the 
definability ofinterpretative properties in non-aesthetic terms or the inter- 
definability ofcertain aesthetic ones, though these things, too, are some- 
times done.5 Quite a variety of observations meant to discredit Sibley's 
sort of non-naturalism ay be just as harmlessly acknowledged with the 
aid of distinctions and qualifications ofthe sort made above. 
There are more substantial difficulties. The epistemological correlate 
of 'non-naturalism' is 'intuitionism'. The incomplete xplicability of 
aesthetic qualities in terms of non-aesthetic properties of things means 
that identification f those qualities cannot be entirely a matter of ordinary 
perception of non-aesthetic properties or of deductive inference on the 
basis of such perception. This requirement need not be characterized 
in terms of empirically suspect modes of awareness if 'intuitionist' theories 
are more austerely expressible by saying that apprehension of aesthetic 
qualities constitutes appraisal. It is no gain, however, to avoid unwanted 
commitments at the cost of vacuity or scepticism, and the explication of 
'appraisal' needed to avoid emptiness encourages a subjective turn just 
as surely as does appeal to sensibility or taste. 
No appraisal concept, A, permits a clear distinction between an object's 
really being A and its merely being considered A. The distinction is 
possible for descriptive and interpretative properties in virtue of possible 
tests for determining if a property isrightly considered to be present. The 
difference b tween being red and being considered red is established by 
reference to normal conditions; the difference b tween being a fugue and 
being wrongly considered one is explained in terms of definitions set out 
in musical dictionaries. Though there is a sense in which properties of 
4 Contrast Marcia Cavell, 'Critical Dialogue', Journal of Philosophy, 67 (I970), 
P. 350. 
5 For the first see Cavell, loc. cit. The latter objection is made by even so 
sympathetic a critic as Isabel C. Hungerland, 'The Logic of Aesthetic Concepts', 
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 36 (i962-63), 
p. 65, though Sibley mentions the interdefinability of aesthetic oncepts in a 
footnote to his first paper. 
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both sorts are human products (they originate in human sense and con- 
vention), once differentiated their presence is determinable independently 
of human observation. The nature of the tests for them puts their recogni- 
tion within the theoretical capacity of suitably equipped automata. Analo- 
gous remarks may not be made about an object's being garish, delicate, 
balanced, or unified. Supposing that Sibley is right to deny the existence 
of logically sufficient conditions for aesthetic qualities, there are no tests 
for these qualities which could be automatically applied, no tests apart from 
human agreement. 
Within a group it is often possible, of course, to convince a person that 
he has wrongly considered something A and thus to differentiate being A 
and being considered A in such a context. What distinguishes aesthetic 
qualities is the absence of any clear difference between being A and being 
generally considered A within a group-whether a whole society or those 
whose ability to agree consistently marks them as experts. The logic of 
aesthetic appraisal thus points more towards relativism than to subjectivism, 
and it has been well said that 'The concepts of Sensibility should not be 
absorbed either to those of Sense or to those of Sensation (feeling)'.6 There 
is a serious question, however, about how this logic is to be understood. 
The force of numbers has no logical authority, nor does the unconfirmable 
testimony of 'experts'; and unless general agreements rest upon factors 
which distinguish similar appraisals from correct appraisals eccentric 
characterizations remain logically impeccable. The existence of 'good 
reasons' for aesthetic ascriptions requires no qualification of this observa- 
tion, for the logical looseness between reasons and the claims they support 
merely reflects the peculiarity of appraisals. It does not alter the fact that, 
in the absence of any clear distinction between really being A and being 
considered A (whether by some individual or within some group), aesthetic 
terms cannot denote genuine properties of things and must have some other 
function. How, then, is this function to be explained in relation to the 
social environment of appraisal? 
II 
The differences between appraisal and other forms of indicative discourse 
can be clarified by means of some comparisons. To say that a pair of scales 
is delicate is one thing, to use the term of a pattern or a complexion quite 
another. In the former case a definable property is ascribed to the object 
in question, though it is a property definable only in terms of specifiable 
standards accepted by many persons. In the latter case no such criteria 
can be specified, and explanation of the characterization must make refer- 
6 Isabel C. Hungerland, op. cit., p. 65. The opinion quoted is supported by 
arguments which partially duplicate the remarks of this and the preceding 
paragraph. 
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ence to the sensitivity, discrimination, or taste of the observer ather than 
to explicit standards. The difference r sembles that between the physician's 
and the critic's use of 'anaemic', the first of which is explicable by reference 
to a measurable standard, the second of which is not. It also resembles that 
between two uses of the word 'criminal', one roughly synonymous with 
'illegal' and definable by reference to a body of law, the other a moral 
concept not so definable. It is not easy to give a positive characterization 
of this difference, but an extension of the analogy between aesthetic and 
moral concepts confirms that the via negativa is not always required for 
the explication of sui generis concepts. It is possible, indeed, finally to 
dispense with analogy as well. 
One of the most important features of moral qualities (broadly construed 
to include any aspects of character, such as fidelity, courtesy, and courage) 
is their being no more condition-governed than their aesthetic counterparts. 
The claim that a person is courageous, for example, can be supported by 
reference to aspects of his behaviour, but the assertion cannot be proven 
thereby, for such assertions do not so much describe behaviour as impute 
a certain significance toit. Courage is steadfastness inthe face of apparent 
danger or difficulty, but this is only a necessary condition of the quality. 
An ascription of courage not only attributes a belief in danger or difficulty 
to the agent but also indicates the observer's belief that the steadfastness 
exhibited is somehow noteworthy. Beliefs of the latter sort are typical of 
characterizations of behaviour in general because qualities are significantly 
attributed to behaviour only when there is something remarkable about it, 
only when it fails to satisfy one's ordinary expectations.7 Examples of 
virtue and vice in particular are always outstanding inthis way and, rising 
above or falling beneath the commonplace, they constitute departures from 
the norms of behaviour upon which men base their expectations about 
others. Norms in this sense determine the means described by Aristotle, 
and the two things vary with each other. In hunting cultures men may be 
expected to endure greater perils than in trading societies, and the proper 
balance between virtue and folly will be differently perceived in the two 
cases. Because of the connection between prevailing expectations and one's 
notions of virtue and vice, the ascription of courage, for example, not only 
expresses an evaluation-that the behaviour in question is worthy of note, 
indeed admiration-but also proves intimately connected with what 
courage is considered to be. Since, furthermore, variations in patterns of 
normal behaviour may produce different expectations from one group or 
period to the next, quite different behaviour may constitute courage or 
cowardice in different societies or at different times. 
7For evidence, see J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers (Oxford, i96i), pp. I37- 
I38. There are cases, of course, in which something can be remarkable for its 
very normality or plainness. Further qualifications occur in the following text. 
'93 
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All this is to say that moral terms no less than aesthetic ones are used to 
make appraisals. It might be suggested that the argument, hence the con- 
cept it is meant o explicate, isvacuous, mistaking the fact that it is always 
inappropriate o assert the obvious for a presumptive logical feature of 
characterizations of phenomena, including behaviour.8 It is always odd to 
assert what is in no way remarkable, and if the propriety of characterizations 
of phenomena depended merely upon avoidance of this fault hen it would 
remain undemonstrated that qualities of behaviour are as intimately related 
to human perspectives a they have been said to be. The argument about 
predicates of behaviour depends, however, not upon a feature common to 
all assertions but upon a peculiarity of phenomena. 'Courageous' and the 
like do not function asordinary descriptive t rms when applied to behaviour 
because the states and actions of individuals, unlike individuals themselves, 
lack properties in an important sense. As referents of verbal rather than 
proper nouns phenomena have 'predicates' with the logical status of 
adverbs rather than adjectives. In consequence, behaviour can never be 
literally described as red or mile-high, aflame or straight, but only charac- 
terized as faithful or courageous, pontaneous or deliberate, sad or yearning, 
lively or quick. It can be characterized insuch terms because sentences of 
the form, 'x's (verbal noun) is A', are equivalent o sentences in which the 
corresponding adverbs occul-, such as 'x (tensed verb) A'ly'. It should be 
noted that this is no formal equivalence, since many sentences of the former 
sort lack this particular paraphrase. Something's occurrence may be 
depressing without its happening depressingly. In this and many similar 
cases an ostensible characteristic of the state, event, or behaviour in 
question belongs rather to a class of 'egocentric' features described below. 
It should be added that there are some genuine features of phenomena 
which can be specified without reference to human expectations. Spatial 
and temporal properties are two, but these relational features constitute no 
important exception to the present hesis. 
The variety of features ascribable to behaviour is associated with a 
number of difficult problems in the philosophy of mind, but it is sufficient 
to recall a distinction between two sorts of appraisal. To the minimal 
evaluation carried by any characterization fa phenomenon-that i is 
somehow noteworthy-use of certain words adds a more specific evalua- 
tion-an indication of excellence or deficiency. To call behaviour coura- 
geous is to evaluate it in both ways, but to characterize itas spontaneous or 
deliberate need be to evaluate it only in the first way. A person can be too 
spontaneous but not too courageous because the latter expression in- 
corporates an indication of approval which the former lacks. Although the 
double evaluation carried by specifically moral notions increases their 
8 The charge has, in fact, been made by John R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cam- 
bridge, i969), p. i44. 
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interest, he characterizing and evaluative function of both sorts of concept 
marks them as belonging to the appraisal family. Concepts of both sorts 
have the pragmatic role which makes them incapable of full explication 
apart from the situations of their use. Deliberateness, no less than courage, 
is ascribed on the basis of prevailing patterns of and expectations about 
behaviour, and its identification may alter with changes in these patterns 
and expectations. Opinions about which actions are considered with suffi- 
cient care and thoughtfulness to be regarded as deliberate are governed by 
prevailing norms of experience. Much the same is true for the concepts of 
emotion. Sadness and yearning are mental states, but they are states in- 
separable from behaving sadly or yearningly. Behaviour is not only the 
evidence for such states but also in a sense determines them. If everyone 
behaved in the way ordinarily characterized as 'sadly', the notion of low 
spirits in terms of which the word is defined would evaporate for want of a 
needed contrast. Not only would such behaviour not be noteworthy; the 
significance and quality of 'sadness' for the affected individuals would be 
quite different from what it now is. 
The application of appraisal concepts to behaviour supports a secondary 
application to persons. Spontaneous, virtuous persons are ones who, 
according to prevailing norms, behave spontaneously and virtuously. 
Conduct, however, is only a guide to character, not identical with it, and 
it is necessary for this reason to distinguish between acting courageous 
and acting courageously, sad and sadly. A courageous man is one who 
typically acts courageously and not merely courageous. Because aesthetic 
objects lack even the tenuous difference b tween 'inner' and 'outer' which 
requires this distinction, one may say that an aesthetic object is A when it 
appears A. A vase is graceful if it typically appears graceful. In other 
respects characteristics of appearances resemble characteristics of behaviour. 
They are to be explicated in terms of human attitudes and expectations 
rather than treated as independent properties of things, or as having tests 
specifiable without reference to human agreements. Appearances are 
phenomena, not individuals, and as features of phenomena esthetic 
qualities are necessarily remarkable characteristics. It is impossible that 
everything should be A because aesthetic qualities exist only within a body 
of experience in which they are distinguished as worthy of note or of 
admiration or disdain. Expressive properties are noteworthy but lack 
logical connections with evaluations of the second sort, whereas delicacy, 
grace, unity, and balance are both remarkable and desirable. The greater 
complexity of such aesthetic virtues and their respective vices raises 
particular problems about the validity of their ascription, and the remaining 
sections of this essay are devoted to their solution. 
It is worth mentioning a troublesome question about the way in which 
the desirability ofcertain aesthetic qualities is determined, for it tends to 
promote an incorrect distinction between moral and aesthetic oncerns. 
'95 
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In the case of moral qualities, evaluations are linked to natural preferences 
and the conditions for their satisfaction i a fairly clear manner. Moral 
virtues, presumably, enhance the viability of any free, secular social 
organization, and participation i such a community involves expectations 
about the behaviour of one's fellows and appreciation of those qualities of 
behaviour which facilitate that organization. In general, if not in every 
case, virtuous behaviour promotes the general welfare. A similar account 
is notoriously acking in the case of aesthetic qualities, they being supposed 
to lack theoretical or practical interest or importance. Although aesthetic 
concerns may be 'gratuitous' in a sense defined by this lack, this makes them 
neither arbitrary nor unserious, and it would be a mistake to infer from the 
lack of practical concerns in aesthetics that there is an important logical 
disanalogy between moral and aesthetic appraisal. 9 Practical considerations 
do cause moral judgments to be often based upon specifiable standards, 
upon rules to which persons are obligated to conform, whereas uniformity 
in art is not demanded, but both halves of this remark are half-truths. They 
should be balanced with the observations that moral virtues, which are 
comparable to aesthetic ones, are not and cannot be obligations because 
of their inherently exceptional character, while conventions about materials 
and rules governing the structure of works are no less binding upon the 
mainstream artist han are moral rules upon the average citizen. Neither 
sort of evaluation described here belongs to the same family as 'obligation'. 
III 
The way in which the logical properties of appraisal terms concern coinci- 
dent opinions makes it appropriate to cast the problem of validity in 
appraisal as a question whether appraisals satisfy a condition of universality. 
Use of any characterizing term expresses the universality of the claim 
ostensibly made thereby. That is, it expresses (though it does not state) a 
claim that the correctness or incorrectness ofthe term's application to a 
given object is determinable inprinciple. Only if this expressed claim is 
true can the predicate contribute to a genuine assertion, and if it is false 
the utterance requires a non-cognitive analysis. In the case of descriptive 
and interpretative terms the necessary determination is possible in virtue 
of available tests which justify affirmation or denial of the claim in question, 
but the use of appraisal terms frequently seems merely to express univer- 
sality and to lack tests which, in supporting or refuting the appraisal, would 
corroborate the implicit claim as well. If appraisals do lack these tests, 
disagreements in aesthetic ascriptions cannot be considered ecidable in 
9 Contrast W. E. Kennick, 'Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake', 
Mind, 62 (1958), pp. 330-332. 
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principle, and agreements inappraisal would have to be explained in terms 
of contingent similarities of response or attitude. Widespread acceptance 
of a statement of the form 'x is A' would merely indicate the generality, or
uniformity, ofsuch response rather than the universality, orverifiability, 
which use of 'A' expresses.10 In this case disagreements inappraisals not 
attributable to their approximating character, or to mistakes in logic, 
interpretation, r brute fact, would amount solely to differences ofevalua- 
tion rather than to substantive questions of validity. 
Sibley has attempted to reduce the formidability of distinctions between 
validity and agreement, universality and uniformity, by denying that 
correctness inascriptions must be a function of verifiability independent of 
agreement. 'The "is" of attribution is tied, for obvious reasons, to the 
group (not necessarily a majority) able to agree regularly on the maximum 
of discriminations.'11 This proves nothing, for the reason already stated. 
Not even completely general agreement of the sort described would 
constitute logically sufficient evidence of universality. It would only 
suggest he existence of unmentioned factors which make possible that 
agreement, and in order to show that the troublesome distinctions men- 
tioned above do not support a dichotomy between objective and subjective 
elements in appraisal, one must identify a basis for uniformity in aesthetic 
ascriptions which distinguishes them from expressions of personal attitudes. 
This can be done by distinguishing three sorts of concept. Those 
earlier characterized as 'descriptive' and 'interpretative' may be termed 
'anthropocentric' in virtue of their theoretical identifiability b any man. 
'Red' is anthropocentric be ause its use is founded upon human anatomical 
structures which permit discernment ofthe shades the word denotes. (This 
is not to suggest hat only human beings could employ such concepts or 
that the colour blind cannot use them competently, for other creatures 
might have nervous systems imilar to human ones and persons with 
adequate vision can provide others with rules-of-thumb for the usual 
colours of things.) 'Symphonic' is likewise anthropocentric, in spite of the 
fact that the symphony is a late development inWestern music. Sufficient 
instruction would permit any normally endowed person to recognize one. 
In contrast to anthropocentric concepts, 'charming' may be termed 
'egocentric'. Whereas 'That is red' expresses a universal claim in the sense 
specified, 'That is charming' expresses at most a general one. Rather than 
to ascribe an observable characteristic to any object, the latter serves to 
report or predict a response and to suggest that people are generally 
10 For a similar view about the evaluative connotations of moral appraisals 
see R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford, i963), pp. i87-i89. See also 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Yudgment, sections 7 and 56, from whom some of 
the terminology and examples of this discussion are borrowed. 
11 'Objectivity and Aesthetics', op. cit., p. 46. 
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charmed by the thing in question. Use of the word 'red' depends upon an 
ability to distinguish red things from others, but use of the word 'charming' 
depends upon a capacity for being charmed, and different persons can, 
without error, be charmed by disparate things. 'That's charming' can 
always be intelligibly contested and the only things which sanction such 
unqualified statements in place of ones of the form 'That's charming-to-x' 
are the frequency of similar responses to similar objects and readiness to 
attach the rider upon request. It is the fact that even unqualified use of the 
word is explicable in terms of individual responses which makes the con- 
cept egocentric. 
The distinction between anthropocentric and egocentric concepts is 
meant to suggest that between 'objective' and 'subjective' and to frame the 
suggestion that aesthetic qualities are distinguishably sociocentric. Although 
the use of words like 'sad', 'yearning', 'elegant', 'delicate', 'garish', and 
'balanced' depends upon human responses to things, it also expresses 
universality; it 'demands agreement'. Such expressed claims can, moreover, 
be substantiated by reference to social knowledge and experience and by 
that alone. That this is so is first indicated by the notability of aesthetic 
qualities and by the membership of notability in a family of attitude- 
reflecting concepts with distinctive logical traits. This family is a large 
one and includes qualities such as being interesting, awesome, piteous, and 
fearful, and a superficial resemblance between these concepts and some 
egocentric, or response-reflecting, ones easily leads to their assimilation to 
the latter category. They nevertheless contrast sharply with the concepts 
of being charming, agreeable, exciting, repulsive, disgusting, depressing, 
and many others, and it is a mistake to treat the groups alike. Agreement in 
the application of the former is a legitimate goal rather than a logical 
accident because there are rational procedures by which warranted agree- 
ment can be brought about and disagreements adjudicated. 
To call something 'notable' is ordinarily to say that it is worthy of notice 
(noteworthy) but might also be to say that it is likely to be noticed (notice- 
able), and the other terms in its group similarly display a possible duality 
of use. They may be evaluative or dispositional, whereas the terms in the 
other group are dispositional only. As such, use of the latter may indicate 
that an object generally charms, pleases, or excites people, but it can 
express nothing about the appropriateness of such responses. There is, to 
be sure, a tendency to say to a person who fails to respond in the expected 
way that he ought to be charmed, excited, or whatever, but this seems to be 
a device by which people attempt to promote uniformity through the 
fiction of a right point of view.12 Such points of view are clearly incapable 
of substantiation. Unlike these hortatory claims, evaluative judgments 
about noteworthiness, and the like, have clear test conditions. 
12 In this connection, see Philippa Foot, 'Morality and Art', Proceedings ofthe 
British Academy, 56 (I970), pp. I3I-I44. 
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The great difference b tween value and obligation is amply illustrated 
by the fact that although to call something notable may be to commend 
it to one's attention itis also to make a claim which is subject o confirma- 
tion or refutation. Because noteworthiness ntails distinctiveness, pointing 
out that the thing in question is an instance of a familiar technique or 
commonly employed device may be sufficient to show that it is not 
genuinely noteworthy; by pointing out another thing's exceptional qualities 
the opposite claim is supported regarding it. Much the same is true of the 
items listed along with noteworthiness. To be fearful, for example, some- 
thing must be dangerous or difficult, and the absence of such qualities 
may show that fear is inappropriate. In practice, the factors which deter- 
mine the appropriateness ofsuch attitudes are extremely diverse, but they 
have in common the raising of levels of knowledge and experience until 
there is sufficient community of understanding toyield agreement. Agree- 
ment results from a similarity of vision which permits determination f
the presence of properties which support or undermine the belief in nota- 
bility or fearfulness-being exceptional or unexplained, conventional or 
commonplace; being dangerous or difficult, benign or simple. There are 
no such procedures available for determining the appropriateness of finding 
something charming or agreeable. In determining whether something is
charming one determines only whether it does in fact charm and there are 
no additional features comparable to distinctiveness which can be referred 
to in justification of the response. Although as a matter of fact one is 
usually charmed only by what is somewhat unusual in one's experience, 
statements of the sort, 'That's charming', lack the logical supports 
characteristic ofnotability. 
To be noteworthy is to be distinguished in some fashion from the 
commonplace,'3 and because such distinctiveness i  a determinable quality 
claims about notability are subject o verification. This is so in spite of the 
fact that notability isnot an anthropocentric, or 'objective', concept, being 
a function of cumulative knowledge and experience and not merely of 
properties of things. It is so because notability is not an egocentric, or 
'subjective', concept either, reference to collective knowledge and ex- 
perience permitting a distinction between what is notable-to-x or even 
notable-to-everyone and what is notable simpliciter. Not agreement 
among individuals but the accumulated learning of society substantiates 
the validity of such claims. An important qualification to this statement 
reinforces the legitimacy of a distinction between what is notable-to-all 
and what is simply notable. The content of knowledge and experience 
13 Not all distinctiveness i  uncommonplace. Gestalt phenomena are very 
familiar and often unnoteworthy, and the analogy between them and aesthetic 
phenomena is incomplete. Contrast Virgil C. Aldrich, Philosophy of Art (Engle- 
wood Cliffs, NJ, x963), pp. 20 ff. 
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constitutes an impersonal standard, and appeal to that standard is consis- 
tent with the possibility that everyone should, through an odd flaw in logic 
or observation, wrongly consider something notable. It is also consistent 
with the possibility that a single individual should be uniquely able to see 
the implications of contemporary knowledge and show others what they 
have hitherto overlooked or overestimated. There is thus a difference 
after all between being A and being generally considered Awithin agroup, 
but not one which makes being A independent of understandings character- 
istic of a group. 
Judgments of notability, though evaluative, are also true or false, and to 
this extent appraisals in general are valid or invalid. Agreements about 
notability are not to be explained either in terms of contingently coincident 
attitudes or in terms of any variety of coercion but in terms of social facts. 
The considerations which substantiate his conclusion do not themselves 
support a similar result about specifically aesthetic appraisal, but they 
provide the foundation for an adequate account of the latter. 
IV 
Even when it is granted that what is worthy or unworthy of note can be 
determined by reference to accumulated experience, it may be doubted 
that any similar tests are available for deciding between such rival claims as 
'It's elegant' and 'It's ostentatious' or 'It's gay' and 'It's garish'. Any 
ascription of an aesthetic virtue or vice supports a claim of noteworthiness, 
but noteworthiness i  insufficient to distinguish among such qualities. 
Those appraisals indicate xcellence or deficiency in some respect, and a 
sound distinction between concepts whose characterizing aspects are 
similar while their evaluative aspects are antagonistic depends upon an 
acceptable distinction of what is genuinely admirable from what is simply 
notable. This can be done by showing that purported virtues and vices 
cannot be discerned at all without he support of the appropriate evalua- 
tion. It is an implication of the thesis that aesthetic qualities are not 
condition-governed that a difference inevaluation involves a difference in
perception. A similar esult has already been reached for noteworthiness. 
If people disagree about an object's notability their opinions about its 
distinctiveness differ, one person seeing it to stand out and another not 
doing so. 
Consider the quality of being garish. It is typical of aesthetic features in 
involving both certain descriptive properties (or at least ruling some out) 
and a certain departure from (or, in other cases, conformity o)proprieties 
of taste or proportion. To believe an object to be garish is to believe it to 
be bright and vivid, excessively or offensively so. Lack of either belief 
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leads to rejection of the appraisal, but the first of them is of no specific 
interest. There are simple ways of settling disagreements about whether 
something is bright or even exceedingly bright. Disagreements about 
whether something is excessively bright seem more intractable. They 
concern ot merely the appropriateness of attention but also of disdain, and 
since attitudes of this second type may still be thought o lack adequate 
tests, the possibility of validity in such appraisals is suspect. 
In the continuing philosophical dispute between those who deny and 
those who discern conceptual connections between characterizations and 
evaluations, the negative voices benefit from possession of an argument 
hallowed by tradition. Itmaintains, in brief, that although many appraisals 
indicate beliefs in the excellence or deficiency of their objects, these beliefs 
are not subject o public validation. Opinions about excellence can ultima- 
tely express only contingent responses to their objects, so that the relation- 
ship between evaluations and their objects is logically adventitious. It is 
always possible, therefore, properly to characterize a quality as 'garish', say, 
without evaluating it as garish. In doing so one recognizes a quality 
generally evaluated favourably but brackets off the usual evaluation. This 
sort of argument successfully withstands a variety of challenges. One may 
point out the non-contingency of some connections between characteriza- 
tion and evaluation-between distinctiveness and notability, for example- 
but justice may be done to these relationships through restrictions upon the 
generality of the argument which do not affect its applicability tovirtues 
and vices. The distinction between two sorts of evaluation already drawn 
is only re-expressed inthe admonition ot to confuse worthiness ingeneral 
with imputations of excellence or deficiency in particular. The argument 
might still be challenged by dismissing this difference as unimportant in
virtue of the decided oddity of suggesting that awkwardness and imbalance 
might be considered better than gracefulness and unity. It can be replied, 
however, that such oddity may be explained in terms of general similarities 
of human nature and existence which do not touch the logical point of the 
suggestion's intelligibility.14 
This second line of defence conceals an area of vulnerability. What seems 
intelligible is that 'awkwardness' (not awkwardness) is better than 'grace' 
(not grace), and these doppelglnger raise a problem of identification. What 
makes 'awkwardness' no deficiency is that the characterizer does not 
consider it awkward, whether because he considers it unawkward or 
because he recognizes no such quality. In either case there seems to be a 
14 For parallel moral considerations see Hare's legitimate disagreements with 
Foot: Philippa Foot, 'Moral Beliefs', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59 
(1958), and R. M. Hare, 'Descriptivism', Proceedings of the British Academy, 49 
(i963), both reprinted in W. D. Hudson, The IslOught Question (London, 
I969). 
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difference of perception as well as a difference of evaluation, and this casts 
doubt upon the crucial assumption that the objects of evaluations can 
always be identified independently of the evaluations they take. 
The assumption is obviously correct when characterization amounts to 
description. One ordinarily meets no challenge in saying that sweet 
strawberries are better than sour ones because people happen to prefer 
sweet, but preferences might have been, or might become, or might else- 
where be, different, and they are not logically incumbent upon any indi- 
vidual. The assumption is also correct for cases in which characterization 
amounts simply to interpretation. Specific attitudes do not necessarily 
attach to the sonnet, which is identifiable by reference to specifiable rules. 
The assumption remains plausible for measurable conditions, like anaemia, 
and for appraisals which attribute neither excellence nor deficiency, like 
spontaneity. (A person might be told, of course, that he ought to prefer 
sweet strawberries and sonnets, or deplore anaemia and spontaneity.) 
The assumption is implausible only when characterization amounts to the 
ascription of virtues or vices. Defenders of the fact/value dichotomy 
typically develop their position in terms of favourable cases and generalize 
upon the basis of these.15 The argument should be supplemented by a 
proof that all appraisal features are identifiable independently of being 
evaluated-that something could be properly characterized as 'garish' or 
'graceful' without being evaluated in the usual way. This possibility is 
inconsistent, however, with the theory that appraisal qualities are not 
condition-governed. 
In the absence of sufficient descriptive and interpretative conditions for 
the qualities evaluated in aesthetic appraisal, there is no way to get from 
'That's exceedingly bright' to 'That's "garish" ' any more than to 'That's 
garish'. Lacking conditions of these kinds, the only test of the characteriza- 
tions inherent in appraisals is social agreement which can be traced to 
shared experience and knowledge, and since these agreements carry evalua- 
tions with them, the opinion that the same qualities could be similarly 
identified but differently evaluated lacks plausibility. In order to charac- 
terize aesthetic qualities correctly while disagreeing with prevailing evalua- 
tions of those qualities, one would need a way of identifying them inde- 
pendently of prevailing agreements, and this is the possibility excluded by 
the theory. There seems to be an equivocation on 'agreement' here, 
however, for one can, it may be suggested, distinguish the agreements pre- 
supposed in any aesthetic characterization from those responsible for 
favourable or unfavourable valuations. If so, then the relationship between 
characterizations and evaluations of the second sort might well be con- 
15 This strategy is evident, for example, in R. M. Hare, 'Descriptivism', op. 
cit. See also Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York, i96i), pp. 
490-494. 
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tingent, and supposed aesthetic vices or virtues, like garishness and grace, 
be no less discernible without bias than such neutral qualities as spontaneity 
and sadness. 
A further a gument suggests that this is not so and that without a specific 
evaluation discernment ofthose qualities considered aesthetic virtues and 
vices would be impossible. Consider the way in which attitudes that have 
tests of appropriateness are supported by beliefs which, together with those 
attitudes, imply worthiness of being so regarded. Thus, a thing which is 
both noted and distinctive isnoteworthy, and a thing which is both feared 
and dangerous i fearworthy. The relationship between the attitude and the 
belief which yield the evaluation is intimate. Not only is the relevant belief 
a necessary condition of the attitude it supports, but the existence of the 
attitudes in question is also required for formation of the concepts which 
permit expression of the belief. If no special attention were given to any- 
thing, nothing could properly be characterized as distinctive, since there 
would be no identified norms or observed regularities from which anything 
could depart. If no one feared anything, then things could be called 
'dangerous' only in a diluted sense-'potential cause of dismemberment' 
and the like. The very existence of danger depends upon people who care 
about it. Parallel considerations are readily adduced for those aesthetic 
qualities considered always to constitute excellences or deficiencies, those 
which are logically tied to such attitudes as admiration or disdain. The 
proper object of admiration is excellence or superiority and the attitude 
could not exist apart from recognition of various excellences. Such excel- 
lences, including aesthetic virtues, would not exist, however, except in a 
derivative, descriptive sense were they never admired. The objects of 
attitude-supporting beliefs cannot be identified yet go unevaluated- 
whether in the minimal sense of noteworthiness or as excellent in the case 
of aesthetic virtues. The ascription of aesthetic virtues in particular cannot 
constitute merely minimal appraisals to which favourable evaluations are 
contingently attached, simply because of the kind of qualities they are. 
Ordinarily itmakes no sense to call something 'too delicate', 'too unified', 
or 'too grand', and the peculiarity of contexts in which such expressions 
are intelligible t nds rather to support han to refute this claim. Either it is 
clear that some other expression would be more literally correct ('precious', 
'stiff', or 'garish', for example) or that an intrinsically desirable quality is 
thought out of place in the work in which it occurs. 
Not all attitude-supporting beliefs are linked to the possession of atti- 
tudes with the same strength. An intelligent being altogether lacking in 
attitudes would be able to recognize those things which normally endowed 
persons consider dangerous on the basis of manifest similarities from case 
to case. Such a being could not consistently recognize which objects 
would be considered garish by others. He could, with some success, employ 
inductive generalizations inthe same sort of way that the colour blind can 
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distinguish colours, but the perceptual diversity of garish objects renders 
such tools of quite uncertain adequacy. 
Tests for aesthetic qualities are quite like those for notability. Com- 
parisons and contrasts from within a common point of view permit decisions 
in disputes about competing ascriptions-decisions based not upon con- 
tingent uniformities of preference but upon preferences inseparable from 
a point of view. Of course, because appraisal involves approximation there 
are always undecidable cases. It is always possible, too, that one person 
may continue to think grand or gay what another thinks garish, and there 
may be a point at which they have no more to say to each other than that 
they are mutual outsiders. The relativism represented by this possibility 
does not, however, represent a logical obstacle to agreement. The obstacles 
are mundane and human. Disagreement indicates widely different sets of 
experiences, a divergence there may be no inclination to alter. On the other 
hand, man is a single species and the inhabitant of one world, and each 
person's experiences are roughly similar. It is a consequence of the 
dissimilarities tha.tc 'A community of interest and taste is not something 
given', but mo e fundamental ikenesses make it 'something that can be 
striven for'.16 That goal need not be desired, but it need not be illusory 
either. In virtue, however, of the dependence of aesthetic qualities upon 
attitudes whose appropriateness is a function of expectations varying with 
experience, one must also recognize that aesthetic qualities do not represent 
logical forms or even anthropocentric properties. Appraisals are distinc- 
tively cultural phenomena. 
McMaster University 
16Paul Ziff, 'Reasons in Art Criticism', in W. E. Kennick, ed., Art and 
Philosophy (New York, i964), p. 6i9. 
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